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This paper first presents the concept of sequential externality, and tries to study 
the correlation between enterprise behaviors and government regulation through the 
perspective of sequential externality, meanwhile also attempts to explain the classical 
economics black box of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" from a new angle of view. 
The conducting phenomenon of sequential externality derives from human’s 
nature of drawing on advantages and avoiding disadvantages, high efficiency resulted 
positive externality is generated along with technology spillover during the process 
when people pursue maximum profit, and finally improves social welfare; Once 
affected by external shocks, people will instinctively shift their augmented cost to 
other people so as to minimize cost and welfare loss of their own, therefore eventually 
leads to additional social cost and social welfare losses. 
So far, the researches on externality theory are limited to static analysis while the 
dynamically conducting problem of externality has been ignored. If we analyze 
externality conducting problem through dynamic perspective, then extremely 
important theoretical conclusions on market efficiency analysis can be obtained, i.e. 
when externality initiator transfer his private cost due to misconduct or altruistic 
behavior, the cost standards of market access changes, in which the positive 
sequential externality reduces externality receptor’s access cost standard, while 
negative sequential externality enhances such kind of standard. Once the externality 
initiator interacts with receptor, the cost standards information of market access will 
be transmitted according to time series, so that due to the stimulation of this 
information, the externality receptors will shift their cost and put themselves in a 
favorable position, resulting in chain conducting of sequential externality, and 
eventually changes the efficiency of economic organization as well as the running of 
market. From the perspective of sequential externality, there is extremely important 
correlation between enterprise behaviors and the formulation of government 
regulation. This paper suggests that in economic field, the criteria for government to 
adopt economic liberalism or sate intervention is mainly depended on whether its 















prevent the transmission of negative sequential externality. 
This paper includes five chapters, the first chapter is introduction, begins with a 
review on research documentary of externality, and concludes that the previous 
researches are still in the stage of static analysis, and then put forward the concept of 
sequential externality on the analysis of chain reaction phenomenon of externality 
among consumers, manufacturers, government agencies and different countries, 
meanwhile the first chapter also describes the significance, perspective, research 
method, framework, innovation and imperfection of this paper. 
The second chapter carries out the description and analysis on the dynamically 
conducting mechanism of sequential externality, and analyzes its dynamic 
optimization with the help of math tools such as calculus of variations, optimal 
control, dynamic programming and Lagrange method. 
The third chapter analyzes the correlation between negative sequential externality 
oriented enterprise behaviors and government regulation, ten kinds of unfair trade as 
well as unfair competition enterprise behaviors which can generate negative 
sequentially conducting externality were discussed in this paper, i.e. confusing trading, 
false propaganda, unfair lottery-attached sales, forced deals, set unreasonable trading 
conditions and bid-rigging, commercial bribery, infringement of commercial secrets, 
business reputation damage, vicious price competition and bundling sales. 
The fourth chapter analyzes the correlation between positive sequential 
externality oriented enterprise behaviors and government regulation, basing on the 
fact that Cobb - Douglas production function refers to two endogenous variables, 
namely per capita effective capital as well as technology, therefore, the depiction of 
enterprise behaviors which can conduct positive sequential externality mainly focuses 
two aspects such as innovation behaviors and investment behaviors. 
The fifth chapter is conclusion, proposes sequential externality’s great 
significance in economic field for the means of selecting economic liberalism or state 
intervention.  
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1.1 文献回顾及问题的提出 

































































首次提出了外部性函数，设 UA 表示个体 A 的个人效用，一系列的活动（X1，
X2，···， Xn）受个体 A 自己控制，而 Y1 是由另外一个社会成员个体 B 所控
制，则个体 A 包含外部性的个人效用可以表达为 UA=（X1，X2，···， Xn，Y1），
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